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ABSTRACT EU institutions are best conceived as representing the peoples of
Europe – a contention set out in the first, introductory, section and developed over
the next five sections. The second section establishes how democratic legitimacy
involves governments being representative of a people and specifies the characteristics
a people need to possess for such representation to be possible. Though no EU
demos exists with these features, the third section shows how in an increasingly
interconnected world, governments have incentives to form associations of demo-
cratic peoples via a process of republican intergovernmentalism. Such associations
guard against the domination of one people by another by preserving the capacity of
the associated peoples for representative democracy. They constitute a form of
demoi-cracy. The fourth section describes how the EU’s system of representation
corresponds to such an association and facilitates mutual respect and fair terms of
cooperation between the peoples of Europe. However, as the fifth section indicates,
moves away from such a union of peoples towards greater political unity involve an
inevitable loss of representativeness and democratic legitimacy. The sixth and con-
cluding section argues the euro crisis results from attempting such a move. Current
efforts to resolve the crisis through yet further integration compound economic with
political failure by circumventing the EU’s associational decision-making mecha-
nisms. The only democratically legitimate and non-dominating solutions will be
those that respect the EU’s fundamentally demoi-cratic character.
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Introduction: ‘An Ever Closer Union Among the Peoples of Europe’
The aspiration to create ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Eur-
ope’ has formed the ostensible aim of the European integration process
since the Treaty of Rome of 1957. However, this goal has tended to be
conceived as the ever greater integration of the various peoples of Europe
into a single European people, rather than as increasing and deeper forms
of cooperation between them. This article defends the latter view on
grounds of democratic legitimacy. It develops a thesis of ‘republican’ as
opposed to ‘liberal’ inter-governmentalism. Whereas a liberal account
views democracy as instrumental to upholding individual rights and inter-
ests, and therefore as being justifiably constrained should so doing serve
to increase these ‘outputs’ (Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2009), a
republican account regards democratic ‘inputs’ as of intrinsic worth, and
the only legitimate means for pursuing and preserving our rights and
interests (Scharpf 2012, 3–13). The terms liberal and republican as
employed here denote normative rather than explanatory theories. None-
theless, they have implications for how we should assess the actual inte-
gration process, with the republican account evaluating the EU according
to how far it has come about via, and continues to uphold, a legitimate
democratic process.
Republicans contend the democratic legitimacy of states rests on their
being representative of a people (Pettit 2010b, 144–50). A democratically
representative system aims to ensure politicians and their policies are
authorised and accountable to citizens in ways that are publically commit-
ted to treating them with equal concern and respect. Such arrangements
create a condition of civic freedom in which citizens are neither dominated
nor dominate. However, republican democracy at the domestic level can
be undermined if states are dominated in their turn by other states or by
organisations and individuals operating across states, such as corporations
or financial institutions (Pettit 2010a, 77–9). The potential for domination
by these various external actors increases as states become more intercon-
nected, posing the problem of how to regulate the movement of goods,
capital, and persons between peoples in democratically legitimate ways.
The solution proposed here is that of an international association of dem-
ocratic states. This article maintains the EU’s political system can be inter-
preted in certain key respects as meeting the requirements of such an
association.
The next section explores the normative case for the focus on peoples.
It elaborates criteria for a demos which can then be deployed to deter-
mine the characteristics the people of a given polity require to sustain a
democratic regime. This analysis supports the no-demos thesis with
regard to the EU. However, if the EU is unlikely to achieve democratic
legitimacy as the representative of a European people, it might be able
to do so as a Union of democratic peoples on the basis of a form of
republican intergovernmentalism. The third section elaborates the ratio-
nale and criteria for such a Union, while the fourth section argues that
the system of representation within the EU can be viewed as conforming
to this model. As a result, the EU can be classified as a demoicracy
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more than a democracy (Nicolaidis 2003, 2013; Cheneval and Schim-
melfennig 2013). The fifth section insists that in the EU context the for-
mer arrangement possesses greater democratic legitimacy than the latter,
a point that the sixth and concluding section illustrates with reference
to the euro crisis.
The Normative Criteria for a ‘People’: Democratic Legitimacy and
Representative States
The term ‘people’ may refer to an ethnic, a cultural, a professional or an
interest group, or even a haphazard agglomeration of individuals. Here,
though, it is employed in a specifically political sense to refer to a group
of persons who regard themselves as forming a political community that is
capable of self-government. This definition of a people is normative rather
than empirical. It involves specifying the criteria for a political order to be
legitimate and the qualities a people must possess for such an arrangement
to be possible, and only then exploring the social and other conditions
under which such qualities are likely to obtain.
Legitimacy can be distinguished from justice and indicates the criteria
that determine whether the exercise of coercive power by political institu-
tions over citizens is justified (Pettit 2010b, 142–3). Legitimacy is more
permissive than justice in that institutions may be deemed legitimate with-
out being fully just – indeed, it allows for there to be disagreements about
justice. While justice may offer pro tanto grounds for complying with the
laws of a given political institution on the part of those who regard them
as just, legitimacy provides pro tanto grounds for accepting these laws
even if one regards them as unjust, and seeking to alter them through the
approved political procedures. Legitimacy may presuppose certain ele-
ments of political and even redistributive justice, such as rights to free
speech and education. However, even these rights only become legitimate
through being established and enforced in ways citizens can endorse as
appropriate.
This way of conceiving legitimacy and its relationship to justice follows
Rawls (1999) and Philip Pettit (2010a and b) in stressing the normative
significance of collective self-government (Macedo 2004, 103). On this
account, the use of coercive power by a government can only be legitimate
when it is exercised via processes and within constraints that are accepted
by those subject to it, and for purposes that correspond to their needs and
values. Therefore, a legitimate government must be representative of the
views and interests of the governed. These criteria might be met in part
within a non-democratic regime, such as those designated by Rawls as
‘decent hierarchical peoples’ (Rawls 1999, 62–70), in which benign and
expert rulers govern according to a moral code subscribed to by the ruled.
However, modern societies tend to be pluralist and complex, undermining
the possibility of a generally agreed comprehensive conception of the good
and rendering the perspective of even well-intentioned and informed rulers
partial and limited. Consequently, the representativeness of such regimes
can be doubted. Democracies seek to overcome these difficulties by putting
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in place procedures of authorisation and accountability designed to ensure
governments represent the diverse views and interests of all citizens with
equal respect and concern (Christiano 2010, 121–2).
Nevertheless, democratic procedures will not operate legitimately unless
they likewise function according to norms and serve ends that can be com-
monly avowed by those involved (Pettit 2010b, 145–49).1 It will not be
sufficient that they involve the public, they must do so on a basis that can
be publically acknowledged by those to whom they apply as fair and
appropriate, not least in demonstrably giving equal consideration to their
views and interests in framing collective policies (Buchanan 2002). No mat-
ter how far such procedures may conform to abstract democratic principles
in theory, their legitimacy will be impugned to the extent their operation is
perceived in practice to reflect unduly the values of a subsection of the
political community, such as the ruling elite, and of responding dispropor-
tionately to their sectional interests (Christiano 2008). As a result, demo-
cratic legitimacy will depend to some degree on whether those to whom
democratic decisions apply relate to each other in ways that render such a
public and equal process possible and appropriate (Rawls 1999, 23–5).
The character of these social, economic and cultural relations, and their
suitability for sustaining the public conditions that underpin the legitimacy
of common political institutions, serve to define a people or demos. First,
to justify giving them an equal say, the persons and groups concerned will
need to have important issues in common that require a collective deci-
sion. Moreover, they must also have a roughly equal stake in the entire
set, if not each and every, of these issues and decisions (Christiano 2010:
130–1). These conditions assume not only a high degree of interdepen-
dence between the members of a political community, but also that their
most important interests are more or less equally tied up in that commu-
nity, and will be so over a long period of time – sufficient for them to care
about the impact of present decisions on future generations – at least so
far as the whole range of collective decisions is concerned. As a result, it
becomes possible to ascribe to them an equal interest in ensuring that the
basic structures of social cooperation are fair and equitable, including
those employed for deliberating on the public good.
Second, there will need to be what J. S. Mill referred to as ‘common
sympathies’ among members of a political community (Mill 1861: Ch. 16;
Rawls 1999: 23–4). We can to some extent detach the logic underpinning
this idea from Mill’s historical and sociological speculations as to its ori-
gins in a shared history and political culture of a kind associated with a
common nationality. The argument is that to ensure the government pur-
sues the public rather than sectional interests; citizens must both conceive
of themselves as a public and be able to act as such and in a public man-
ner (Miller 2009, 212–13). For example, a religious or ethnic group will
be more inclined to seek rules that oppose discrimination against all
groups, rather than to employ government power to suppress groups dif-
ferent to theirs, where solidarity exists between groups, so that they see
themselves as part of the same political community. They must also be
capable of sharing certain public principles that extend beyond the
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convictions of their own particular group, such as a commitment to a
given understanding of toleration. Finally, it helps if there is sufficient pub-
lic communication between groups for politicians to have to address the
public as a whole, rendering it harder for them to play different groups
off against each other.
Third, as a corollary of the two aforementioned points, democratic
legitimacy will be harder the more divided a society is into discrete and
insular publics, with distinct interests and views on key issues (Dahl 1989,
258–9). In these circumstances, politics is much more likely to be factiona-
lised, increasing the probability of persistent minorities, with compromises
on a common position harder to negotiate. Meanwhile, moves away from
the status quo are likely to involve pork barrelling and derogations that
increase transaction and policy costs.
The norms and processes that structure decision-making, on the one
hand, and their acceptability to and suitability for a given people, on the
other, comprise the regime and polity aspects of legitimacy respectively
(Bellamy and Castiglione 2003). To the extent the one is congruent with
the other, it becomes possible for a state to be so organised that its gov-
ernment is representative of its people. Such legitimate representative
states provide citizens with civic freedom of the kind republicans associate
with freedom as non-domination (Pettit 2010b, 144–5). For the regimes of
such polities provide the means for their citizens to secure and advance
their interests on an equal basis to each other as defined by public terms
and procedures that they can share and control as a people. Citizens can
ascertain that the administration and legislation conform to public norms
and pursue public purposes, informing and controlling the definition of
these norms and purposes as part of an on-going process of public deliber-
ation among and between the people and their representatives. As a result,
governments are constrained from governing arbitrarily – according to
their own or some sub-group’s views or interests. They can only employ
the coercive power of the state in so far as they have been authorised and
are accountable to do so on grounds that conform to the commonly
avowed views and interests of the people they serve.
Thus, states have legitimacy to the extent they are able to represent peo-
ples in ways that are public and equal, and in so doing create mechanisms
that provide for civic freedom among citizens. Of course, these criteria are
not met in full by any actually existing democratic states. No regime rep-
resents its polity entirely equally and publically – not least because peoples
are rarely sufficiently homogenous for that to be possible. However, even
among quite diverse peoples, the regime can be so tailored to the composi-
tion of the polity as to promote equity and publicity among different
groups to some degree, as the experience of various multinational and
multicultural states indicates. Yet, as these states also illustrate, the more
economic, historical and cultural divisions become aligned with territori-
ally concentrated groups and/or the various social cleavages found within
pluralist societies cease to be cross-cutting and become segmented in ways
that create separate political communities, the less acceptable collective
decision-making among them tends to become. Over time, one or more
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groups begin to question not just the regime but also the polity legitimacy
of the state, demanding ever more devolution of power (Kymlicka 2001,
212–13).
This issue poses a potential problem for those who wish the EU to
become a polity (e.g. Duff 2011, Habermas 2012), a point to which I
return below. Most commentators acknowledge that while the EU pos-
sesses a regime of a supranational as well as an intergovernmental nature,
its transnational polity-like features are at present limited (Weiler, Haltern,
and Meyer 1995). This situation reflects the nature of the integration pro-
cess as a series of intergovernmental agreements. Therefore, the issue to be
addressed here is whether such a process can be consistent with the
account of democratic legitimacy given above, especially if successive
agreements give rise to and further empower supranational institutions. In
particular, what circumstances might justify such a development and
which criteria must the resulting arrangements meet to retain democratic
legitimacy?
Republican Intergovernmentalism and a ‘Union of Peoples’: The Criteria
for an Association of Democratic States
As was noted above, a legitimate state offers its citizens the conditions
whereby they can enjoy civic freedom. These domestic conditions will be
insufficient, though, if the ability of the state to represent its people is
undermined by bodies external to it, not just other states but also private
organisations, such as corporations or financial institutions, that are
located in other states or operate to some extent multi- or trans-nationally
(Pettit 2010a, 77–9). External interference by other states – be it intended,
as in the case of conquest or the threat of armed conflict, or an unintended
product of various negative externalities resulting from domestic decisions
– limit the capacity of governments to represent their peoples in fairly
obvious ways. A government that must act to palliate or defend against
the potential aggression of a hostile state is dominated by that other state.
It is inhibited in its actions and to that extent is unfree to respond to and
represent the views and interests of its citizens, curtailing their freedom in
the process. Likewise, if the domestic policy choices of one state effectively
undermine those of another, say by one state polluting upstream from
another state that has tried to reduce pollution, then the behaviour of the
one reduces the presumptive options of the other in ways that involve
illegitimate coercion of one people by another.
Powerful states can also dominate weaker states in numerous ways that
fall short of explicit interference (Pettit 2010a, 73–7). For example, they
may impose inequitable and disadvantageous terms of international trade
on them by exploiting various forms of economic pressure that arise from
their control of important markets, their ability to manage various
financial instruments, or their access to key resources, and so on. Power-
ful corporations can exert similar forms of pressure and influence, as
when they threaten to withdraw from states with taxation or employ-
ment policies they regard as unduly reducing their profits. In such
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situations, governments become to a greater or lesser degree controlled
by these alien powers. They feel obliged to act ‘responsibly’ and satisfy
these various external demands lest the domestic economy suffer and be
less able to supply the basic needs of the population. Yet such responsi-
ble action can lead to a failure to adequately represent the concerns of
their own citizens. For example, they might overturn domestic employ-
ment laws or cut public spending in ways citizens not only did not desire
but also would not have needed to do had it not been for such external
demands (Mair 2011).
These examples are not intended to highlight problems of global distrib-
utive justice per se, although such issues are connected, but rather prob-
lems of global political justice that result when one state’s capacity to be
democratically legitimate gets undermined by the dominating actions of
another state or of some other organisation based within another state or
states (Macdonald and Ronzoni 2012). Even if the aforementioned actions
of states and corporations were deemed entirely just in distributive terms,
as some libertarians might argue if the pressures involved no direct inter-
ference and respected formal rights to freedom of contract and property,
they would still infringe the moral interest a people has in collective self-
government. At a minimum, therefore, states seeking to have their own
democratic legitimacy respected have reason to acknowledge a set of inter-
national norms whereby they respect the democratic legitimacy of others
by observing a duty of non-intervention (Rawls 1999, 34–5). Yet, in an
increasingly interconnected world, states are likely to interact so intensely
and frequently that there will be ample scope for some to exert various
forms of domination over others. Such domination may stop short of
direct intervention but inhibit and intimidate states in ways that undercut
their representative character. Interconnectedness also generates problems
that can only be effectively tackled through collective action between
states, where again powerful states may skew common agreements in their
favour without deploying outright coercion. Finally, globalisation has
brought with it not simply greater interaction between states but also
directly between their peoples and citizens. Not only are peoples involved
in global processes of production and exchange, but also migration is
altering their character, rendering them increasingly multicultural, and cre-
ating a growing problem of stateless persons and denizens, who belong to
dispersed and oppressed peoples and lack citizenship.
As a result of these developments, peoples and persons have a growing
interest not only in the legitimacy of democratic decision-making within
states but also between them (Pettit 2010b, 151–2). On the one hand, they
will wish their governments to be representative of them when negotiating
with those of other states, and for the negotiations to give equal weight to
each state so that the ensuing accords tackle matters of common concern
in mutually beneficial ways. In other words, they will wish similar criteria
of publicity and equality to operate in the international sphere as they do
at the domestic. On the other hand, peoples will want their direct interac-
tions with other peoples to involve mutual respect on both sides, with
each respecting the domestic rules and regulations of others so long as no
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peoples discriminate against other peoples when it comes to trading or
travelling in a different state to their own. In other words, every state
should treat all peoples as equals under domestic law, with a similar rule
of non-discrimination operating for those seeking access to citizenship and
prepared to undertake the same duties as already existing citizens.
It might be argued that the easiest way to meet these various desiderata
would be to establish an international regime on the model of a domestic
state with authority over member states (Held 1995). Yet such an interna-
tional regime would itself only be capable of democratic legitimacy to the
extent it could become suitably congruent with an international polity.
However, even advanced processes of globalisation have not generated
anything like the same degree of interdependence between states as exists
within them, with multinational production estimated at barely 10 per
cent of output in the world’s most integrated economies (Christiano 2006,
86). As a result, the degree to which citizens of a global democracy would
share common issues and have an equal stake in collective decisions is
likely to be rather limited at best. Similarly, the common sympathies
needed for public reasoning also face the challenge of linguistic and cul-
tural diversity between and within different existing peoples. On both
counts the likelihood of persistent and intense minorities and majority tyr-
anny seems highly probable (Christiano 2010, 132–4).
At the regional level these problems are arguably less severe. Regional
economies are far more integrated, especially the EU where intra-EU trade
is higher than extra-EU trade in each EU member state, with the exception
of the United Kingdom (Eurostat 2011). However, as the Euro crisis has
revealed, integration has not produced economic and social convergence
between states. Nor have a European people, sharing a common political
identity and public sphere, come into existence. Fewer than 15 per cent of
EU citizens consistently identify themselves as Europeans compared to
around 40 per cent who consider their identity to be exclusively national,
with the 15 per cent being disproportionally composed of the well
educated and highly mobile (Fligstein 2008, 141–2, 156). Likewise, no
pan-European media of any significance have come into existence, with
European discourse again restricted to elites. At best, there is evidence of
some modest Europeanisation of the various national media and the simul-
taneous and parallel discussion of EU issues (Risse 2010). As a result,
pan-European political mobilisation has proven decidedly weak. Parties
remain embedded in national systems, with European Parliament (EP)
elections largely second-order national elections (Hix and Marsh 2011).
Much the same can be said of civil society organisations. Again, there is
evidence of some Europeanisation of national organisations, yet these
remain mainly focused on influencing domestic policy (Beyers and Kerre-
mans 2007). Therefore, the infrastructure needed to connect individual
European citizens to legislative power at the EU level in a public and
equal way is lacking. Indeed, the politicisation of European integration
has mainly fuelled right-wing euro sceptic populist parties within the
member states rather than promoting trans-European federalist political
movements (Bartolini 2005).
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The rest of this article lays out an alternative model for achieving demo-
cratic legitimacy within the EU to a European polity – that of an interna-
tional association of democratic states. Such an international association
seeks to promote and be compatible with the possibility for all individuals
to live in representative states that possess democratic systems where
collective decisions are made in ways that show them equal respect and
concern through being under their public, equal control. Four criteria guide
this republican intergovernmentalist arrangement. First, this argument pre-
supposes a commitment to the values of representative democracy, and
their equal enjoyment by all peoples. Second, if the legitimacy of demo-
cratic states stems from them offering reasonably effective, public mecha-
nisms for the identification and equal advancement of the interests of their
citizens, then the legitimacy of international systems stems from them doing
likewise through being in their turn under the shared and equal control of
the signatory states acting as the representatives of their respective peoples.
Third, citizens of different peoples ought not to be discriminated against in
their interactions. The mutual concern and respect that operates among
states ought to apply to the citizens of those states in moving and trading
between them. Finally, membership of such international systems should be
voluntary. Not all states will have an equal stake in collective arrangements
on a given issue, and many will not have equal bargaining power. Volun-
tary arrangements allow states to tailor their international commitments to
the interests of their populations and ideally to negotiate the terms of their
adherence accordingly.
The next section applies this model to the system of representation
within the EU. The analysis shall show how in many respects it proves
compatible with these criteria, even if its current practice often falls short
of fulfilling them. The resulting republican intergovernmentalist account
provides a picture of the EU in which democratic states negotiate an ever
closer union of mutual benefit to their peoples while preserving the civic
freedom of their citizens.
Demoicracy and the System of Representation within the EU
In formal terms, the Post-Lisbon Consolidated Treaty of the European
Union (TEU) can be aligned with all four of the criteria outlined above –
even if this interpretation is contentious and may fall short in practice. I
shall take each of them in turn.
1. A commitment to the values of representative democracy
The first criterion is evident in the preamble, which confirms the Union’s
‘attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human
rights’, and in Article 2, which notes how these values are ‘common to the
member states’. The contracting parties also affirm that the deepening of
‘the solidarity between their peoples’ has to be balanced by ‘respecting
their history, their culture and their traditions’, while the process of ‘an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’ has to be one ‘in which
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with
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the principle of subsidiarity’. Indeed, Article 4 explicitly requires the
Union to ‘respect the equality of member states before the Treaties as well
as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, politi-
cal and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’ and
portrays the Union as based in a principle of ‘sincere cooperation’ and
‘mutual respect’. Thus, the commitment to democratic values goes hand in
hand with respect for the ways these may have been configured differently
by the various peoples and that as far as possible decisions ought to be
taken by each people.
2. Shared and equal control of the international association by the
signatory states acting as the representatives of their respective peoples
The second criterion, whereby an international association should be
under the shared and equal control of the signatory states in order to
ensure the public and equal advancement of the interests of their respec-
tive peoples, emerges from the account of the Union’s political system in
Title II. This commits the Union to being itself organised in accordance
with democratic principles and the equality of citizens, with Article 10
explicitly grounding its functioning in representative democracy. This Arti-
cle identifies three channels whereby European citizens are represented in
the EU’s political system: directly via elections to the European Parliament
(EP), indirectly via their heads of state or government in the European
Council (EC) or in the Council by their government, and in domestic elec-
tions which hold these last democratically accountable to national parlia-
ments (NPs) or to citizens.
Of the three, the second channel – whereby citizens are represented in
the EC by heads of state or government and in the Council by members of
their governments – prima facie corresponds most obviously to the repub-
lican intergovernmentalist model. Although the EC has no legislative func-
tions, it ‘defines the general political directions and priorities’ of the Union
(TEU 15.1), not least because any major change would require a revision
of the Treaties in which national executives naturally take the lead. Deci-
sion-making is also invariably taken by consensus, which nominally at
least respects the norm articulated above of giving equal weighting to each
member state. The situation in the various configurations of the Council is
more complicated, but similar reasoning prevails. Even though qualified
majority voting (QMV) is formally the default for decision-making, in
practice it operates through consensus wherever possible. Moreover, the
proposed double-majority rule for QMV from 1 November 2014, involv-
ing 55 per cent of member states representing at least 65 per cent of the
population, is designed to ensure that decisions must balance the interests
of large and small states by preventing the former imposing a decision on
the latter and vice versa.
Although NPs are mentioned in the main text of the Treaty for the first
time, the negative and positive roles assigned them in Art 12 TEU play an
important role in ensuring that the member states act as representatives of
their peoples as the second criteria demands. Executives traditionally
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exercise wider discretion in foreign compared to domestic policy, and this
remains true of the EU despite its significant domestic impact. Hitherto
European issues have rarely been salient in domestic elections, and so the
election of governments cannot per se ensure they represent citizens with
regard to the EU. NPs perform a potentially crucial function in this
regard. On the one hand, they have a right to be informed by Union insti-
tutions and to see draft legislative acts and have formed European Com-
mittees to scrutinise them and the decisions made by ministers. They may
also send reasoned opinions to the Commission and engage in an informal
political dialogue. Empowering parliaments in these ways can be justified
as ensuring ministers continue to represent their peoples when negotiating
within the Council. On the other hand, the Treaty introduces an ‘Early
Warning Mechanism’ (EWM) that assigns national legislatures the right to
scrutinise proposed EU decisions and initiatives for compliance with the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Furthermore, NPs can have
a collective legislative influence in that a majority of them may force, by
way of a so-called ‘orange card’, an early vote on an EU legislative pro-
posal in the Council and the EP. They are also now involved in the evalu-
ation of measures taken within the area of freedom, security and justice
(Articles 70, 85, 88 TEU), may block Treaty changes under the simplified
revision procedures (Article 48 TEU) and must be informed of new appli-
cations to join the EU (Article 49 TEU). These powers serve the republican
intergovernmentalist purpose of providing a means for the component
demoi of the EU to ensure the integration process only extends to those
areas that clearly require international collaboration, and does not under-
mine democracy at the national level. Indeed, the enhanced cooperation
between NPs within COSAC offers among the clearest expressions of a
republican demoi-cracy in facilitating the direct interaction between the
representatives of the different peoples of Europe (Cooper 2012).
On the surface, the EP offers a less obvious fit with the model. The
wording of Article 10 suggests the existence of a European demos in stat-
ing that European citizens are represented directly in the EP. However,
Union citizenship derives from being a national of a member state and is
‘additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it’ (Art 9 TEU).
The derivative and additional character of this status is reflected in the
way seats are allocated within the EP by member state rather than simply
by population, employing the principle of ‘degressive proportionality’,
with a minimum threshold of 6 seats for the smallest member state and a
maximum of 96 for the largest (Art 14.2 TEU). The official rationale
behind this arrangement has been to ensure that the range of political
opinion found in even the less populous member state gets represented.
Indeed, European parties do not mobilise a pan-European electorate, but
are rather groupings of national parties within the Parliament. As the
German Federal Constitutional Court noted in its Lisbon judgment (2BvE
2/08: para. 286), the EP’s allocation formula is testimony to the absence
of a European demos and the need adequately to represent each of the
European demoi. Therefore, the EP can also be conceived as an institu-
tional embodiment of European demoi-cracy.
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3. Mutual respect and non-discrimination between the citizens of the
states within the association
Like the very status of Union citizenship, the representation of citizens
even in the EP as members of national constituencies, can also be linked
to the third criterion of non-discrimination and equality between citizens
of different peoples. This is a key element of Union citizenship (Articles
18– 25 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). Union
citizenship does not provide citizens with goods or services through EU
funds or agencies. It offers access on a par with national citizens to
engage in economic activity with, and enjoy the services and benefits pro-
vided by, another member state, and – certain judgments of the Court of
Justice of the EU (CJEU) notwithstanding – need not be seen as creating
a unified European citizenry. It is only activated through a member state
citizen moving to, or trading with, another member state. Moreover, cer-
tain ‘limitations and conditions’ justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health protect various non-market liberties asso-
ciated with national citizenship. Thus, the 1990 Residence Directives,
later repealed and incorporated into Article 7 (1) b and c of Directive
2004/38, together with certain provisos of Article 45 TFEU, restrict the
right of residence to those engaging in economic activity or possessing
adequate funds not to become a burden on the national system of social
assurance and covered by sickness insurance. The definition of national
citizenship remains a preserve of the member state, and EU citizens resi-
dent in another member state can vote in local and European elections
but not in national ones.
4. A voluntary association, as not all states have an equal stake in every
decision
Finally, the fourth criterion, whereby such an international association
should be voluntary and in the long term equal interest of the peoples con-
cerned, could be regarded as guiding the need for all treaty changes to be
negotiated and unanimously approved not just by member state govern-
ments, but also by their peoples – either directly via referenda or indirectly
by a majority of their parliamentary representatives. Member states have
also negotiated numerous opt-outs from particular EU policies. Such vari-
able geometry reflects a situation in which membership of such an associa-
tion is not imposed or compulsory in all respects, but can be tailored to
the needs of each contracting people.
The Limits of Demoi-cracy
The resulting political system involves more counter-majoritarian checks
and balances than are found in any national democracy. EU legislation
must secure consensual support from national leaders within the European
Council to be placed on the agenda, a proposal from the majority of the
Commission, a formal 2/3 majority – but in practice a consensus – of
weighted member state votes in the Council of Ministers, a series of
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absolute majorities within the EP – which as we saw can itself be viewed
as involving a series of coalitions between national parties – and the assent
and active support of the 27 national administrations, legal systems and
parliaments responsible for its implementation (Moravcsik 2008, 334). In
a domestic context, such high consensus requirements ought not to be nec-
essary and would be hard to justify. Among a demos, there should not
only be sufficient solidarity for majoritarian decision-making to be accept-
able, but it also provides the fairest and most public means for treating all
citizens equally. By contrast, between demoi it is not necessary to meet as
stringent standards of political and social justice.
As we saw, republican intergovernmentalism aims at ensuring the inter-
actions between representative states are mutually advantageous while
protecting their equal rights to collective self-determination (Miller 2008,
394–6). Each of these states has its own internal systems of social and
political justice for which its citizens are co-responsible thorough their
equal participation within majoritarian systems of democracy. To the
extent the non-dominated status, wealth and survival of these states
depends on cooperation with other states, it seems appropriate to share
the costs and benefits of these arrangements equitably. To provide such
agreements with democratic legitimacy it will be sufficient that the citizens
of each member state are satisfied that this is an area where interaction
and cooperation is necessary or desirable – for example in order to set fish
quotas so fishing will be sustainable or to promote trade. Moreover, the
surpluses generated by such accords need only be Pareto-improvements,
with each party gaining from the resulting benefits subject to compensa-
tory measures for temporary losers so that a ‘no wealth effects’ condition
holds. For this purpose, a mix of consensual and super-majoritarian mech-
anisms between representatives of states and their peoples will be justified
since nothing in such a system suggests any change is required with the
status quo so far as the relative standing of the parties involved is con-
cerned. Central institutions, such as the CJEU, can be justified as solutions
to prisoner’s dilemmas and free riding, in order to ensure all states
maintain their mutually beneficial commitments in a credible manner.
However, to meet the four criteria, they need to be ultimately under the
control of the contracting states and peoples.
The difficulties arise when such a political system is forced to operate as
if it was representing a pan-European citizenry because its decisions have
either undercut the capacity of the member state to respond to the
demands of their citizens, or entered policy areas where no such win-win
solutions exist. For example, the teleological reasoning of the CJEU in
regard to Union citizenship has drawn criticism from some commentators
for judgments such as Schwarz2 and Watts3 that give citizens rights to
access public services across the Union with no correlative duty to contrib-
ute to their provision (Scharpf 2012, 20). Advocate General Stix-Hackl
claimed in Schwarz that ‘shortfalls in tax revenue are [not] to be taken
into consideration as matters of overriding general interest’ when member
states seek to overrule free movement and residence rights. Yet, such mat-
ters go to the heart of the capacity for member states to respond to their
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citizens’ priorities when setting their budgets (Nic Shuibhne 2008). Not to
take them seriously, risks disturbing the reciprocal ties between citizens
that make public spending sustainable. Moreover, no mechanism exists to
address the problem by transfers between member states, because the EU
has neither the competence nor the democratic legitimacy to promote
social welfare or public goods at the pan-European level.
Such decisions not only override the demoi-cratic decision-making struc-
ture of the EU but also undercut democracy at the member state level with-
out creating it at the EU level. This problem has been even more apparent
in the series of judgments where the CJEU has prioritised EU level economic
freedoms over member state level social rights (Viking,4 Laval,5 Rueffert,6
and Luxembourg7). In these cases, the Court has attempted to impose a
uniform, minimum standard of wage legislation that overrides local collec-
tive bargaining agreements, thereby hindering the exercise of union rights.
Neither these decisions nor those regarding access to public services have
contributed to the creation of a European demos because they dissociate
social and economic rights respectively from membership of a political
community in which all citizens must participate as equals. In the case of
access to public services, the Court overlooks the mutual obligations citi-
zens have to contribute to maintaining public goods at a sustainable level
for all. In the case of economic freedoms, the Court undermines the politi-
cally negotiated balance between labour and capital, designed to achieve a
degree of equity between the two. In both cases, the CJEU has misconstrued
Union citizenship as if it consisted of a set of human rights to participation
in a spontaneously arising and self-sustaining free market, rather than being
grounded in the mutual recognition of the rights of citizens within an asso-
ciation of democratic states (Bellamy 2012, 157, 161–164). This failure to
respect the democratic systems of the member state proves self-defeating.
For it is these systems that provide the basis for Union citizenship not only
formally, in that citizenship of an member state is a precondition for Union
citizenship, but substantively, in that it is collective solidarity among
citizens of each of the member states that generates the legal, economic and
social infrastructure on which the enjoyment of their economic and other
rights as Union as well as national citizens depend.
The EU requires the cooperation of the associated member states to
implement policy – apart from them its existence is exiguous at best. To
flout or circumvent the EU’s demoi-cratic structures, therefore, can only
undercut both the legitimacy and the efficacy of its decision-making, risk-
ing in the process the very forms of inter-state domination the avoidance
of which provides its most compelling rationale. Yet, these structures limit
not just how the EU can act but what it can do. By their very nature they
are ill-suited to policies that imply or require a demos to be legitimately
and effectively pursued.
Conclusion: The Eurocrisis – Beyond Demoi-cracy?
This article has explored the normative case for conceiving the EU as an
‘ever closer Union of peoples’ rather than as the formation of a European
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people. That case rests on considerations of democratic legitimacy and the
role a people plays within a system of public and equal political represen-
tation capable of securing conditions of civic freedom. A people of the
requisite kind are unlikely to exist at the global or European level. How-
ever, this case is consistent with representative states forming an interna-
tional association to secure mutual concern and respect between their
peoples given their increased interaction. The EU in many respects resem-
bles such an association, and can be characterised as the product of a pro-
cess of republican integration.
A demoi-cracy should not be understood as an alternative form of
democracy – it has a different scope. It exists to regulate the interactions
between states rather than their internal processes. That poses limits to the
sorts of policies the EU should attempt to pursue. The Eurocrisis reveals
the problems of going beyond these limits all too dramatically. The single
currency was supposed to produce a convergence of the member state
economies. Instead, it reinforced their divergent dynamics. As a result, the
international financial crisis has had a far greater impact on the former
soft-currency countries of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy than
on Germany and most northern economies. However, the type of rescue
package the EU can offer has been constrained by the capacity of its polit-
ical system to redistribute between member states. As a result, it has been
limited to addressing state-credit crises rather than the underlying eco-
nomic problems of the debtor economies, and involved strict conditionali-
ties designed to protect the investment of the taxpayers of creditor states.
Yet, this approach compounds the original democratic legitimacy problem.
For in removing core budgetary decisions from domestic politicians, the
discipline imposed by the Fiscal Pact and the EU’s Six-Pack Regulations
effectively institutionalise a system of domination of the creditor over the
debtor states – precisely the sort of situation the EU exists to prevent
(Scharpf 2012, 23–24). In George Soros’s words, the crisis ‘has trans-
formed the EU from a voluntary association of equal states into a credi-
tor-debtor relationship from which there is no easy escape’.8 Indeed, these
measures have been largely designed outside the Union’s demoi-cratic deci-
sion-making processes, sidelining not only the supranational institutions of
the EP and Commission but also the intergovernmental mechanisms of the
Council. As Joseph Weiler has remarked, ‘the resort to an extra-Union
Treaty, as a centrepiece of the reconstruction, is but the poignant legal
manifestation of this political reality’ (Weiler 2012, 831).
This problem has led to calls for greater political integration so as to
institutionalise republican democracy at the EU level (Habermas 2012).
The analysis presented here suggests there are normative as well as empiri-
cal problems with this proposal. The experience of existing multinational
states suggests that the presence of multiple demoi within the EU would
give it weak polity legitimacy at most and require a highly complex regime
that would be unlikely to be able to provide citizens with public and equal
control over governments. Some authors contend that segmental cleavages
among national demoi might be counterbalanced by transnational cross-
cutting cleavages between pan-European interest groups and parties
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(Bohman 2007, 313). However, such pan-European groups and parties are
largely artefacts of the EU, operating as umbrella organisations of national
associations that are themselves largely not Europeanised. Even the 2 per
cent of Union citizens who live in another member state to their own seem
only moderately Europeanised (Favell 2008). Habermas’s suggestion that a
post-national commitment to civil and political rights might overcome the
no-demos problem obscures the fact that it is precisely such a commitment
that underpins demoi-cracy at the EU level: for it goes hand in hand with
acknowledging the right of each people to institutionalise these rights in
their own way.
Therefore, the normative challenge posed by the crisis is to justify trans-
fers between the member states without undermining the right of each
people to be publically and equally represented in national and interna-
tional decision-making. Paradoxically, though monetary union itself may
have overstepped what a republican intergovernmentalism could legiti-
mate, the crisis might justify quite generous if temporary transfers between
member states in order to sustain their equal capacity to remain self-gov-
erning (Laborde 2010). However, exploring this avenue falls outside the
scope of this article. What can be affirmed is that, absent a European
demos, political union would compound rather than assuage the lack of
democratic legitimacy of the current rescue package. The EU would prove
to be not only a sub optimal currency area but a sub optimal democracy
area, composed of extremely heterogeneous demoi. The challenge, there-
fore, is to find a solution consistent with the demoicratic character of the
EU. Though a survey of the potential solutions cannot be addressed here
what does follow from the above is that the only policies likely to prove
legitimate and lasting in the long run are those that can be made and
sustained through the existing demoi-cratic structures.
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Notes
1. The criterion of ‘commonly avowed’ should not be understood as entailing universal consent,
which most regard as impossible to meet (Simmons 1976), but rather the weaker notion of equal
respect for the views of the governed by virtue of the existence of a plausibly democratic system
that gives citizens equal participation in decision-making (see Buchanan 2002).
2. Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz v. Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach [2007] ECR I-6849.
3. Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust [2006] ECR I–4325.
4. Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking
Line [2008] IRLR 143.
5. Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefo¨rbundet [2008] IRLR 160.
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6. C-446/06 Dirk Ru¨ffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] IRLR 467.
7. Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323.
8. George Soros, ‘How to Save the European Union from the Euro Crisis’, Speech in Frankfurt 9
April 2013 as reported in The Guardian, 10 April 2013, 27.
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